Court Dismisses Whistleblower Retaliation Claim

Court Dismisses Whistleblower Retaliation Claim

  Friday, May 03, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently dismissed a police officer’s whistleblower retaliation claim. Blisset v. City of Chicago.

A police officer was demoted from the rank of Commander to Captain under a police department’s restructuring of its detective units and areas. After being demoted, the officer sued the City under the Whistleblower Act arguing he was retaliated against for disclosing illegal activity, refusing to participate in illegal activity, and that the police department retaliated against him for exposing public corruption or wrongdoing. The police officer alleged his demotion was retaliation for disclosing information to City attorneys about another officer’s attempt to commit perjury and his refusal to participate in a conspiracy to commit perjury.

The Whistleblower Act. 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq., prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee for disclosing information which the employee reasonably believes discloses illegal activity to the government or law enforcement, or for refusing to participate in an illegal activity. The police officer argued that the Whistleblower Act created a private right of action against the City for retaliatory actions taken against him for disclosing public corruption. The circuit court ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the case, finding that the police officer failed to prove he disclosed information about an activity he reasonably believed to be illegal or that he refused to participate in illegal activity.

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the lawsuit. The Court noted that the Whistleblower Act required the police officer to show an invitation to participate in illegal activity and his refusal to participate. Here, the police officer failed to show that he was invited to participate in an illegal activity by any member of the police department or the City. Additionally, the Appellate Court ruled the police officer lacked a reasonable belief that he was disclosing information about an illegal activity as the statements made by the other officer were not made under oath. Finally, the Appellate Court rejected the police officer’s argument that the Whistleblower Act created a private right of action, finding that the Act merely defined actions by the police department that would constitute unlawful retaliation and did not grant the police officer a private right of action. 

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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DOJ Issues New Rules on the Accessibility of Web Content

DOJ Issues New Rules on the Accessibility of Web Content

  Thursday, May 02, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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In April, U.S. Department of Justice announced new regulations that require state and local governments to comply with Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (Accessibility Rules). Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act requires that state and local governments ensure that people with disabilities have an equal opportunity to benefit from programs, services, and activities. The new Accessibility Rules serve to supplement the protections under Title II, which previously covered local governments’ website content and online activity, but did not impose technical standards of conduct. The Department of Justice has explained that the new Accessibility Rules will ensure people with disabilities are able to engage in virtual services provided by state and local governments, including their ability to register to vote online, access public transportation schedules, and submit requests to their representatives.

The technical standards imposed by the new Accessibility Rules, referred to as Level AA, are an intermediary standard of compliance that was created by the Americans with Disabilities Act. In order to comply with the Level AA standard, government entities must offer alternative text for images displayed onscreen, transcripts to be posted alongside videos, a heightened color contrast, and consistent navigation across the local government's website or mobile app.

The Accessibility Rules will be imposed on different units of government gradually, depending on the number of constituents served by the government entity, the medium of web content (a website or mobile app, for example), and the relative importance of the subject matter. For example, the Rule requires that if the government body serves fewer than 50,000 persons, those entities have three years to comply. Government bodies that serve more than 50,000 persons only have two years to come into compliance with the new standards. The Accessibility Rules cover both web content and mobile apps, but provide exceptions for archived content, preexisting documents and social media posts, reposted content originally created by a third party, and individualized password-protected documents.

See more information about the Accessibility Rules here, and the full text of the Accessibility Rules here. 

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Supreme Court Holds that Legislatively Enacted Impact Fees Are Not Exempt from Nollan and Dolan

In the Zone: Supreme Court Holds that Legislatively Enacted Impact Fees Are Not Exempt from Nollan and Dolan

  Wednesday, May 01, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued an opinion finding that legislatively enacted impact fees are not exempt from the "takings" analysis required by Nollan and Dolan. Sheetz v. County of El Dorado, California. 

The owners of property in the center of the El Dorado County, California that was zoned in the low density residential district applied for a building permit to build a small, prefabricated house. As a condition to the permit, the County required the owners to pay a $23,420 traffic impact fee as required by the County's General Plan rate schedule. The owners paid the fee under protest and received the permit, but then sued the County in state court.

The owners claimed that the County's condition of a building permit on the payment of a traffic impact fee constituted an unlawful “exaction” in violation of the Takings Cause of the Fifth Amendment. The owners relied on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n and Dolan v. City of Tigard, which they argued required the County to make an individualized determination that the fee imposed on their permit was necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to their specific development. They claimed that the County's traffic impact mitigation fee was not calculated based on any “individualized determinations” as to the nature and extent of the traffic impacts caused by a particular project on state and local roads and, instead, the fee was established by a formula based on the location of the project (i.e., geographic zone within the County) and the type of project (e.g., single-family residential, multi-family resident, general commercial).

The trial court rejected the owners' claims and the California Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that the Nollan/Dolan takings test applies only to permit conditions imposed on an individual and discretionary basis and that fees imposed on “a broad class of property owners through legislative action” such as the traffic mitigation fee adopted by the County did not need to satisfy the Nollan/Dolan takings tests. 

This case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. That Court recognized the government's authority to regulate land use and condition a building permit to further a “legitimate police-power purpose.” However, the Court held that legislatively-imposed fees are not exempt from the Takings Clause and could violate the Fifth Amendment if they do not have an “essential nexus” to the government’s land use interest and “rough proportionality” to the development’s impact on that interest.

The Supreme Court noted that the text of the Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions and either could constitute an unconstitutional condition on land-use permits. The Supreme Court  did not determine the validity of the County’s impact fee in this case, or the degree of specificity required when tailoring an impact fee and instead sent the case back to the state court for further proceedings. 

It is important to note that the Supreme Court's ruling does not prohibit local governments from enacting and enforcing reasonable permitting conditions, including imposing legislative-enacted impact fees on a development. However, local governments will want to make sure that their impact fees comply with the nexus/rough proportionality test set out in Nollan and Dolan. 

Post Authored by Megan Mack & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Approval of Contract Extending Beyond Mayor’s Term a Valid Exercise of Home Rule Authority

Approval of Contract Extending Beyond Mayor’s Term a Valid Exercise of Home Rule Authority

  Tuesday, April 30, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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In 2021, a home rule municipality (Village) entered into a contract with a vendor (Vendor) for IT services. The Village approved the contract for a 5-year term through a resolution unanimously adopted by the Village Board. The terms of the contract provided that either the Village or the Vendor could terminate the contract, but only after providing written notice to the other party that there had been a breach. For several months, the Village paid the Vendor for services under the contract. At that point, however, the Village Manager informed the Vendor that the contract was not “working out,” and the Village prohibited the Vendor from providing the services for the remainder of the term. The Vendor sued the Village and Village Manager, claiming that the Village had wrongfully terminated the contract without a notice of breach, and that the Village Manager had unlawfully interfered with their performance of the agreed-upon IT services.

In response to the lawsuit, the Village claimed the contract was invalid and void because it violated Section 8-1-7(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code, which provides that municipalities cannot enter into contracts for a term exceeding the term of the mayor or president holding office at the time the contract is signed. Since the contract was signed in April 2021, and the then-Village President’s term was set to end in May 2021, the Village argued the contract was not valid. The trial court agreed with the Village and dismissed the lawsuit.

On appeal, the Vendor argued that because the Village is a home rule municipality, it was not bound by the statute. The Vendor argued that the Village's resolution approving the contract clearly stated it was acting “in the exercise of its home rule powers,” and that evidenced the Village’s intent to enter into the contract for the full 5-year term. In response, the Village argued  it could only exercise its home rule authority by passing an ordinance, not a resolution.  

The Appellate Court ruled in favor of the Vendor, finding the Village had superseded state statute by adopting the resolution and expressly invoking its home rule authority in the text of the resolution. Proven Business Systems LLC v. Village of Oak Lawn. The Court determined that a home rule municipality has the authority to enter into contracts for an extended term so long as (1) the contract is approved by a majority vote of the corporate authorities and (2) the approval shows an intent to supersede the requirements of the statute. Because both of these circumstances were satisfied by the resolution and contract in this case, the Court found the Vendor's lawsuit should not have been dismissed by the trial court. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti, Ancel Glink

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Court Rejects First Amendment Challenge to Public Comment Policy

Court Rejects First Amendment Challenge to Public Comment Policy

  Friday, April 26, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently upheld the dismissal of a First Amendment and civil rights challenge to a municipality's public comment policy and various other actions. Eberhardt v. Village of Tinley Park.

The plaintiff had previously filed a lawsuit in federal court against the village challenging a variety of actions, including a First Amendment challenge to the village's public comment policy that restricted comments at a special village board meeting to those that are "germane" to agenda items at that special meeting. In 2021, the federal court dismissed the lawsuit on several bases, including that the special board meeting was a "non-public forum" and the "germaneness requirement" was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 

In 2022, the same plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court raising similar challenges to the public comment policy, but also raising an argument that the policy violated the Illinois constitution. This state lawsuit also claimed that the public comment policy violated the Illinois Open Meetings Act and that a complaint filed with the ARDC (the attorney disciplinary commission in Illinois) violated his civil rights as retaliation and suppression of his First Amendment rights.

The circuit court dismissed all of the claims raised in the state court complaint. On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld that dismissal, as discussed below:

First Amendment Claims

First, the Illinois Appellate Court determined that the federal district court's decision involving the same parties precluded his claims in state court with respect to the federal constitution, finding "collateral estoppel." The Court discussed the federal court's forum analysis as well as other courts' analysis on the type of forum that a municipal board meeting operates as, and concluded that the appropriate test for this particular case (involving restrictions on a special board meeting) is whether the restriction is reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The Appellate Court agreed with the federal district court's 2021 decision that the restriction was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions finding "relevancy" restrictions for municipal meetings to be reasonable. 

The Court also acknowledged that the "germaneness" restriction was a blanket prohibition and did not selectively suppress speech to a single viewpoint, message, or speaker.

The Court also noted that members of the public could address the village board on any topic at regular board meetings since the germaness restriction only applied to special board meetings.

In short, the Court found that the First Amendment challenge to the public comment policy was properly dismissed, and determined that the Illinois constitution provided no greater protection on this issue.

Open Meetings Act Claims

With respect to plaintiff's Open Meetings Act claim, the Court first held that the OMA expressly provides that public bodies can adopt rules on public comment, which is what the village did in this case. In any event, the Court held that even if the rule violated the OMA, it would not establish a First Amendment violation.

Civil Rights Retaliation Claims

The Court also rejected his civil rights claim that the filing of a disciplinary complaint with the ARDC was retaliatory or interfered with his First Amendment rights. The Court found no facts to support that the filing of this complaint actually did deter him from speaking at meetings or filing lawsuits.

Appointment of Outside Counsel

Finally, the Court rejected his argument that the retention of outside counsel was unauthorized or violated the village code. First, the Court found he did not have "standing" to challenge the village's decision since he was not a taxpayer. And, even if he had standing, the Court determined that his complaint was deficient as it did not include facts to support his argument. The Court rejected his argument that outside counsel was an "officer" that was subject to mayor appointment. The Court further rejected his argument that the village manager did not have authority to retain outside counsel, pointing to language in the purchasing ordinance authorizing this action. Finally, the Court noted that the village board ratified the manager's decision to retain outside counsel, curing any deficiency if there was one.

In sum, the Appellate Court found that the case was properly dismissed by the circuit court.

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Appellate Court Upholds Revocation of Firefighter’s Pension Benefits for Felony Conviction

Appellate Court Upholds Revocation of Firefighter’s Pension Benefits for Felony Conviction

  Thursday, April 25, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court recently upheld a pension board’s decision rescinding a firefighter’s retirement pension benefits due to a felony conviction. Trapp v. City of Burbank Firefighter’s Pension Fund.

A city firefighter retired in 2017 after allegations were raised that he had an inappropriate relationship with a high school intern cadet at the fire department. The Pension Fund Board (Board) approved the firefighter's application for a retirement pension in 2017. In 2020, the firefighter pled guilty to knowingly possessing child pornography by soliciting sexually explicit photos and videos from a high school cadet while he was employed as a city firefighter.

The Board held a hearing to determine if the firefighter’s felony conviction forfeited his right to pension benefits under the Pension Code. The firefighter argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to hold a revocation hearing since the Board did not appeal its initial decision awarding the firefighter pension benefits in 2017. The Board rejected that argument, finding that the felony conviction was related to firefighter’s service as a city firefighter, and issuing a decision revoking the firefighter’s pension benefits.

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld the Board’s decision revoking the firefighter’s pension benefits. The Court rejected the firefighter’s argument that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hold the revocation hearing, determining that the revocation hearing was a new hearing authorized by the Pension Code and not an appeal of the initial hearing. Based on the Pension Code, the Appellate Court held that a pension board has the authority to hold new hearings to divest a firefighter of pension benefits for conviction of service-related felonies without needing to appeal the initial award of pension benefits.

Post Authored by Tyler Smith, Ancel Glink

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8th Circuit Finds First Amendment Violation in Government Official Blocking User from Twitter Account

8th Circuit Finds First Amendment Violation in Government Official Blocking User from Twitter Account

  Tuesday, April 23, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An interesting case about government social media was decided by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in January of this year. Felts v. Green. This decision came out before last month's U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lindke v. Freed that adopted a new "test" for when a government official or employee is engaging in "state action" on their personal social media account for purposes of First Amendment challenges. It's still worth reporting on even if it preceded the USSCT ruling because the test applied in the Felts case is pretty similar to the test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court.

The President of the City of St. Louis Board of Alderman was sued after he blocked an individual from his Twitter account for posting criticism of his support for closing a local jail. The district court ruled against the President, finding that he used his Twitter account primarily for government business and his actions in blocking the user constituted "viewpoint discrimination." The City then appealed.

The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals first rejected the City's argument that the case was "moot" because (1) the President had since resigned and (2) the President had unblocked the user after she filed the lawsuit. The Court determined that a voluntary unblocking of the user did not prevent the same action from happening again and that the City could still be held liable for the former President's actions even after his resignation. 

Next, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the President's blocking of the  user qualified as "state action" under the civil rights statute, applying a "policymaking authority" test. The Court determined that the President had final authority regarding communication on behalf of the City, and that his decision to block a user from Twitter was a "deliberate choice of a guiding principle and procedure to silence online critics." The Court noted that the President had alternatives such as ignoring the Tweet or replying to the Tweet and his decision to block the user was an exercise of his final policymaking authority as President of the Board of Aldermen. As a result, the Court found the City of St. Louis liable under Section 1983 for the President's actions in blocking the user from Twitter in violation of her First Amendment rights.

The test that the Court of Appeals applied is pretty similar to the test that the U.S. Supreme Court adopted in Lindke, and seemed to focus on the official's "actual authority" and his exercise of that authority. This differs from the "appearance" test that the Supreme Court expressly rejected in Lindke and that the 8th Circuit seemed to rely on in an earlier case involving the social media account of a Missouri State Representative (Campbell v. Reich). That "appearance" test focuses more on the "trappings" of the account or page that is the subject of the challenge (i.e., the account is primarily used for government business, references the official's title/position, etc.) rather than a focus on the authority of the official to communicate or take action on behalf of the government body.

It will be interesting to see how the district and courts of appeals apply the new Lindke test as they face these First Amendment challenges that are likely continue to be filed as government officials and employees increase their use of social media to communicate about government business.

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Administrative Review Law Was the Exclusive Remedy for Backpay Claim

Administrative Review Law Was the Exclusive Remedy for Backpay Claim

  Tuesday, April 16, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a Sheriff's office employee that sought backpay related to an unpaid suspension in Coduto v. Cook County.

In August of 2016, an employee in a Sheriff's office was suspended without pay after he was arrested for his third offense of driving while under the influence. The Sheriff then filed charges with the Sheriff’s Merit Board seek terminationation of the employee. While the charges were pending, the employee remained on an unpaid suspension, and two years after charges were filed, the Merit Board suspended the employee for 180 days.

The Sheriff appealed and the circuit court upheld the Merit Board’s decision. Neither party appealed this decision. However, the employee subsequently filed a separate lawsuit seeking back pay from the Sheriff's office for the period of time he was on an unpaid suspension in excess of the Merit Board's 180-day suspension.

The Sheriff filed a motion to dismiss the backpay lawsuit based on the following: (1) the employee's coplaint failed to state a valid mandamus claim; (2) the employee's sole recourse was to appeal the Merit Board's decision under the Administrative Review Law; and (3) his claim was brought too late. The circuit court ruled in favor of the Sheriff and dismissed the case. 

On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the employee's lawsuit, finding that the employee should have raised the issue of backpay at the original administrative hearing and then by filing a  Administrative Review Law action within 35 days of the final decision of the Merit Board, and his  failure to seek relief through administrative review was fatal to his case.

Post Authored by Madeline Tankersley & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Appellate Court Determines Zoning Restrictions From 50-Year-Old Case Still Applicable

In the Zone: Appellate Court Determines Zoning Restrictions From 50-Year-Old Case Still Applicable

  Monday, April 15, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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An Illinois Appellate Court reversed a trial court’s decision that denied a family that owned neighboring property owners the right to intervene in a 1970 lawsuit in order to enforce certain zoning restrictions and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. Hatch v. City of Elmhurst

In 1970, four landowners successfully sued the City over zoning rules that prevented them from building apartments. The decision forced the City to allow the project subject to certain restrictions which included prohibiting structures on certain areas of the property unless specified adjoining lots were held by common ownership. The court retained jurisdiction over the case to enforce these restrictions.

In 2017, a developer purchased several of those adjoining properties with the intent to construct parking lots. In 2021, the City held several public hearings on the proposed parking lots, and a family that owned an adjoining lot, unrelated to the original landowners, appeared with their attorney at multiple hearings to object to the plan. Ultimately, the City Council passed an ordinance to approve the parking lots. 

In 2023, the family filed a motion to join the 1970 lawsuit and enforce the zoning restrictions against the proposed parking lots, claiming the proposed project violated those zoning restrictions. The trial court denied the request, and the family appealed.

The Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's decision to deny the family the ability to join the 1970 lawsuit. First, the Court noted that the court had expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the zoning restrictions, and when those conditions were not met, the family whose property was expressly identified in the 1970 lawsuit had a unique property interest that supported their request to join the case and enforce the restrictions. Second, the Appellate Court rejected the City’s argument that the family's challenge was actually to the 2021 zoning approval and should have been brought within 90 days of the approval of that ordinance under state statute. The Court determined that the family was enforcing their rights under the 1970 case, and not challenging any City action concerning the 2021 ordinance.

Post Authored by Daniel Lev & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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Court Dismisses Due Process Claim Relating to Tobacco License Revocation

Court Dismisses Due Process Claim Relating to Tobacco License Revocation

  Friday, April 12, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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In AZ SPE, LLC v. City of Chicago, an Appellate Court dismissed a due process lawsuit brought by a company whose tobacco licenses had been revoked.

AZ SPE, LLC (AZ) leases property to gas station operators. Advanced Petroleum, one of AZ’s tenants, received notice from the City's Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (Department) of a hearing to determine if its tobacco retail license should be revoked as a result of alleged sales of tobacco to minors. At the hearing, the City presented evidence of three violations and the hearing officer found Advanced Petroleum responsible and revoked its tobacco license.

Section 4-64-935(c) of the City's Code provides that when a tobacco license is revoked, no tobacco license can be granted to any entity for a year for the premises described in the revoked license. AZ was notified by the Department that the revocation of Advanced Petroleum’s license would apply to AZ’s property and that any new application for a tobacco license for that property would be denied during the one-year ban.

AZ sued, alleging that the City Code deprived it of its property interest because the ban lasts for one-year on the premises, making its property less attractive to prospective tenants. AZ also argued that it was entitled to notice of the revocation hearing and an opportunity to be heard at the hearing under the 14th Amendment as the owner of the property. Finally, AZ argued that punishing the property owner for the actions of its tenant violated its due process rights. 

The Appellate Court first held that the right to sell tobacco is not a protected property right under the constitution so AZ's due process claims were not viable. The Court also noted that the City Code provisions authorizing revocation for selling tobacco to minors were not arbitrary nor discriminatory and were rationally related to the City’s interest in protecting minors from the sale of tobacco products. As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of AZ’s lawsuit against the City.

Post Authored by Alexis Carter & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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In the Zone: Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 82 - APA-CMS Bar Exam 2024

In the Zone: Quorum Forum Podcast Ep. 82 - APA-CMS Bar Exam 2024

  Thursday, April 11, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Ancel Glink's Quorum Forum Podcast Episode 82: APA-CMS Bar Exam 2024, has been released featuring a recording of the live planning law session at this year's "bar exam" hosted by the APA-CMS. A summary of this episode is below:

The American Planning Association Chicago Metro Section recently teamed up with Ancel Glink’s Quorum Forum podcast for the ninth annual “Bar Exam” planning law session, a realistic simulated law school experience testing planners and land use professionals on important planning law cases related to social media, short-term rentals, and more! Recorded live at Vintage Bar on Taylor Street on March 13, 2024 with Ancel Glink attorneys Dan Bolin, Megan Mack, and Greg Jones, everyone literally "passed the bar" after attending this session. 

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In the Zone: Illinois General Assembly Considers Land Use Legislation

In the Zone: Illinois General Assembly Considers Land Use Legislation

  Wednesday, April 10, 2024    Julie Tappendorf

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Since the Illinois General Assembly convened in mid-January, several bills concerning zoning and land use have been introduced that may be of interest to our readers. We have summarized a few of these bills below and will provide timely updates as they make their way through the legislative process.

House Bill 4213 – Accessory Dwelling Units

House Bill 4213 was introduced during the General Assembly’s veto session in November, and if passed would create the “Local Accessory Dwelling Unit Act.” The bill seeks to limit local government authority, for both home rule and non-home rule units, to prohibit the building or use of accessory dwelling units (ADUs). However, the bill makes clear that local governments may provide reasonable regulations relating to the size and location of ADUs similar to other accessory structures, so long as the regulations do not “have the effect” of prohibiting them outright.

Senate Bill 2716 – Judicial Review of Zoning Decisions

Senate Bill 2716 seeks to amend Section 11-13-25 of the Illinois Municipal Code to limit the authority municipalities have when considering zoning decisions, including special use and variance applications, text amendments, and map amendments. The first part of the bill proposes that zoning decisions should not be considered legislative decisions, but rather administrative decisions, meaning these zoning decisions would be subject to a different standard of review if challenged in court. The second part of the bill provides for “protection against disregard of the decision-making body’s own ordinances or regulations,” which, if enacted, would appear to be an attempt to limit the exercise of home rule authority. 

Senate Bill 2881 – Annexation Agreements

Senate Bill 2881 seeks to limit municipalities’ ability to annex property. If passed, the bill would require any land subject to an annexation agreement to be contiguous (directly touching) to a municipal boundary. The bill creates uncertainty regarding the status and validity of existing pre-annexation agreements for properties that are not yet contiguous to a municipal boundary, and invites differing interpretations that could result in litigation over these agreements’ terms and conditions.

Additionally, the bill would significantly restrict communities from using annexation agreements to address a variety of issues that have long been regulated by agreement, such as local land use regulations, contributions of land or money to government bodies who are impacted by potential development, and property tax abatements. The bill contains an express list of topics municipalities are not allowed to address in annexation agreements, including mandatory rezoning and terms regarding “nonspecific, future” development projects.

Senate Bill 3680 – Crime-Free Housing

Senate Bill 3680 seeks to amend the Illinois Municipal Code to prohibit local governments from adopting crime-free housing ordinances. The bill, which contains express language clarifying it would apply to limit home rule authority, prohibits any “program, ordinance, resolution, or other regulation” that:

• Penalizes landlords or tenants, guests, or others for contact with law enforcement;
• Requires or encourages landlords to evict tenants or household members for contact with law enforcement, a criminal conviction, or alleged unlawful conduct;
• Requires or promotes the use of criminal background checks for current or prospective tenants;
• Defines nuisance behavior to include contact with law enforcement;
• Requires tenants to secure certificates of occupancy as a condition for leasing rental housing or turning on utilities;
• Creates or promotes the use of a registry of individual tenants for the purposes of discouraging or prohibiting renting to particular tenants;
• Penalizes tenants, guests, or other for contacting the police or emergency services; or
• Requires a crime-free lease addendum that sets forth limitations on any of the above activities.

Many municipalities have regulations concerning crime reduction in housing that would be affected if this bill passes. 

Post Authored by Erin Monforti & Julie Tappendorf, Ancel Glink

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